Cyberterrorism is the act of hacking into government computer systems, but under the Patriot Act also extends to hacking into and damaging any networked computer. It is punishable by up to twenty years in prison. Cyber sleuthing laws were also taken into account, and it was determined that Federal agents can gather information about suspected terrorists once they have a court order. The information must be relevant to an ongoing investigation, and enables the agent to track the sites being visited, and the names and organizations that are corresponded with via email. In order to see the contents of the emails additional authority is required. Federal agents are also able to obtain court orders for roving wiretaps on individuals suspected of terrorist activities. The law enables them to listen in on any of the phones the suspect uses.

In 2006 the Patriot Act was reenacted, with some sections of the original law deleted or amended. One of the most significant changes was the creation of a new Assistant Attorney General for National Security. This had the effect of consolidating previously disparate national security and intelligence operations.

The act is a controversial one, with many believing that it violates the constitution. In particular, it has expanded the rights of law enforcement to seize and search which seems to violate the right to privacy. It is also contested that the vagueness of the definition of “domestic terrorism” means that those using their First Amendment rights in expressing disagreement with government policies could fall into this category. Some attorneys have suggest that the act does away with the right to the due process of law, particularly in the case of immigrants. At the end of the day it is down to federal agents and judges to exercise the new powers in a legitimate fashion, but this leaves the act open to interpretation that violates the constitution.

Model Penal Code § 212.1 defines kidnapping as an occurrence “when any person is unlawfully and nonconsensually asported (moved) and held for certain purposes. These purposes include gaining a ransom or reward; facilitating the commission of a felony or a flight after the commission of a felony, terrorizing or inflicting bodily injury on the victim or a third person and interfering with a governmental or political function.” A precise definition of kidnapping is difficult to pin down as the definition varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Most state and federal kidnapping statues define the term vaguely and allow courts to fill in the details for their particular jurisdiction.

At the federal level, the Lindbergh Act, passed by Congress in 1932 is the standard set for a federal kidnapping charge and was enacted to prohibit interstate kidnapping (48 Stat. 781 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201 et. seq.). The act provides that if a victim of kidnapping is not released within twenty-four hours after abduction, a court may presume that the victim was transported across state lines, thus making the kidnapping a federal offense. The defendant does not necessarily have to know what lines have been crossed; he must simply know that they have, in fact, been crossed.

Other kidnapping situations which fall into federal-crime category include kidnapping by deception as well as by force, receiving, possessing, or disposing of ransom, taking hostages by bank robbers, threats to kidnap and ransom demands sent through interstate communications or the United States mail. In addition, federal kidnapping statutes include confinement for purposes of involuntary servitude and compelled labor against one’s will (paid or unpaid) and even offenses of harboring a runaway and unlawful sale of a public conveyance travel ticket to a minor.

Two key elements common to all charges of kidnapping are asportation (removal of the victim from a place of security to one of greater danger) and detention. However, under most state and federal statutes, not all seizures and asportations constitute kidnapping, allowing police to arrest and jail persons suspected of a crime, or allowing parents to reasonably restrict and control the movement of their children. The asportation element of kidnapping has been dropped as an element of the crime in some state statutes due to the determination of the degree of asportation being a difficult concept to describe.

The states that dropped the asportation element rely on other circumstances of the charge to establish the danger of confinement. In Creek v. State, (Ind. App. 1992), a sleeping child who was not moved or even aware of being confined was still the victim of a kidnapping. And in People v. Taylor, (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), the victim of a robbery restrained in a vacant apartment and tortured after his possessions were taken, was considered a victim of kidnapping, because the restraint was not simply incidental to the robbery but unnecessary and cruel.

The penalty for kidnapping in the United States is severe, with most states making it a crime to attempt or conspire to commit a kidnapping. A conviction of kidnapping usually results in a sentence of imprisonment for a certain number of years and depends in part upon the circumstances of the incident at hand. In some states and on the federal level, the incarceration term for a kidnapping conviction may be for life. In jurisdictions where the death penalty is on the table, a kidnapping conviction of a capital offense (one where the kidnapping results in death), the sentence may be death. Most kidnapping statutes designate different types and levels of kidnapping and assign punishment accordingly, depending on the purpose and length of the abduction. However, all kidnapping convictions result in some jail time with the shortest amount of time being around three years, and in severe cases, a life sentence with or without parole.

Defenses for a charge of kidnapping include a good faith belief in consent and consent. A good faith belief defense means that the defendant is not guilty of kidnapping because he reasonably and actually believed the other person consented to the movement. Consent purports that the other person did indeed consented to go with the defendant. The other person consented if he: (1) freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the defendant, (2) was aware of the movement, and (3) had sufficient maturity and understanding to choose to go with the defendant.

The precise definition of a hate crime varies from state to state. Some states define a hate crime as any crime based on a belief regarding the victim’s race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or ancestry. Some states exclude crimes based on a belief regarding the victim’s sexual orientation. Others limit their definition to certain crimes such as harassment, assault, and damage to property.

In all states a victim’s actual status is irrelevant. For example, if a victim is attacked by someone who believes that the victim is gay, the attack is a hate crime whether or not the victim is actually gay or not. In essence there are two types of hate-crime statues that are punishable by law. One type defines a hate crime as a discrete offense and provides stiff punishment for that offense, with ethnic intimidation always one degree higher than a base offense. For instance, menacing, according to Ohio statues, is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree, but menacing based on ethnicity is a more serious offense, classified as a third-degree misdemeanor and penalized more severely. A second version of hate-crime statutes enhance punishment for certain offenses that are motivated by hate. For instance, under Wisconsin law, an ordinary class A misdemeanor is punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000 or up to nine months in jail, or both (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.51(3)(a); add a hate-based intent to that class A misdemeanor, and you up the ante to a maximum fine of $10,000 and imprisonment for up to two years.

Constitutional issues are often raised by hate crime statutes. Two landmark Supreme Court cases focused on some of these constitutional issues in the early 1990s. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, (1992), the Court struck down a local ordinance that outlawed placing on public or private property a symbol or object likely to arouse “anger, alarm, or resentment . . . on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.” The defendant had been charged under the ordinance after burning a cross in the yard of an African American family. Even though the “speech” at issue fell into the analytical category of “fighting words,” which the Court had previously maintained was of low constitutional value, the Court held that the ordinance was based on a personal viewpoint and thus facially unconstitutional.

Later, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, (1993), the Court upheld, against a First Amendment challenge, a state statute that increased a defendant’s punishment for battery because he selected his victim on the basis of the victim’s race. In a unanimous opinion, the Wisconsin Court rejected the defendant’s argument, adopted by the lower court, that the penalty enhancement represented punishment for bigoted thought. The state could legitimately punish criminal conduct motivated by bias more than the same criminal conduct without such motivation because of the greater harm likely to flow from such bias. After R.A.V. and Mitchell, hate crimes statutes in the form of penalty enhancements became the preferred form of hate crime enforcement at both federal and state levels.

Defenses for hate crime charges, including gay hate crimes, center on whether or not the hate crime conviction would violate a person’s First Amendment rights and the concept of due process. Sometimes laws against hate crimes conflict with rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, allowing those charged with a hate crime a valid defense. Generally, the First Amendment protects a citizen’s right to the free expression of thoughts. However, the courts have ruled, that at times, First Amendment rights may give way to the greater public good. In determining the constitutionality of hate-crime legislation, a primary question is whether the prohibited speech deserves First Amendment protection or not.

In addition a person may be charged with illegal possession of weapons if the person is either not allowed to possess such a deadly weapon as a condition of a prior conviction or the possession is inconsistent with the laws for registration and possession of deadly weapons. Most states have a list of weapons that are illegal to possess or that require a permit to possess.

Deadly weapons include but are not limited to guns, ballistic knifes, belt buckle knifes, cane swords, Billy clubs, large-capacity ammunition magazines, ammunition with (or containing) an explosive agent, camouflaging firearm containers, any gun not immediately recognizable as a firearm, or metallic knuckles. However, since the advent of airline restrictions as a precaution to terroristic threats, the definition of a deadly weapon can include any object capable of inflicting death or injury. In reality, it is impossible to list everything that could constitute a dangerous weapon, and legislature has left the definition up to the courts to define on a case-by-case basis, U.S. v. Dishman, 486 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1973).

Debates about the laws surrounding illegal possession are ongoing and heated, and center on the interpretation of the Second Amendment of the United States that states that law-abiding citizens have a right to bear arms. As a result of the many debates surrounding the issue of gun control and the Second Amendment, little uniformity exists among the states regarding weapons possessions laws, making the conviction of a charge of illegal possession of weapons complicated.

Each state has its own specific regulations for the sale and possession of weapons that includes the particular requirements that have to be met by an individual to possess concealed and assault weapons, the background and criminal history of the owner of the weapon, as well as the licensing and purchasing requirements of such possession. Seven states prohibit concealed weapons, and in over half of the states, all non-felons are able to obtain a license to carry a concealed weapon. Vermont, however, has no licensing or permit requirements for weapon possession. Thus, questions surrounding the exact nature of criminal possession of a weapon charges are rampant, and with each state having differing sets of regulatory requirements murky, at best.

Federal law makes it unlawful to possess firearms after a felony conviction of any kind, even if the sentence was suspended (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). However, it is permissible to possess a weapon following a misdemeanor conviction except during the term of the sentence when firearm prohibitions are universally in effect as a condition of probation. An exception is when a person has been convicted of a domestic assault misdemeanor under which federal law bans the possession of a firearm for life (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). And while federal law and most state laws prohibit anyone convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm, a restoration of civil rights or expungement or pardon of a conviction may allow a felon to regain weapons possession rights (18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).

Federal, state and local laws governing weapons regulatory issues undergo significant changes often. Reconciling the differences that exist between federal and state legislation and understanding the rights as a non-felon United States citizen or a person with a criminal conviction is complicated. Since 9/11, new laws have broadened the scope of punishable conduct, and courts appear to err on the side of the prosecution when a weapons possession charge is the issue. Given the potential consequence of ten or more years in federal prison for weapons possession, it is wise to be up-to-date on what is and what is not a weapon.

If you violate an illegal weapon law, you have generally committed a felony and could face criminal punishment that can include jail time (from one to five years), fines, (from $100 to $1000), probation or parole, loss of the right to own a deadly weapon, community service, and/or loss of your driver’s license in addition to other penalties determined by various state and local statues. Criminal possession of a weapon is a serious offense.

Defenses for a charge of illegal possession of weapons may potentially include the showing of insufficient evidence concerning the possession, proof of factual innocence of the person charged, or evidence that was obtained illegally in violation of federal or state search and seizure laws.

Terroristic threatening

Threatening words alone can suffice to qualify a person for a charge of terroristic threatening. For example, a defendant, who said to his victim, “Do you want to live?’ in an effort to keep her quiet during a rape, was charged not only with the rape but for making a criminal terroristic threat in Allen v. State, (Del. 1982). A Wisconsin man who discharged a gun and was feared to be suicidal said that if he chose to shoot himself, he would first shoot the judge, a “brain-dead son of a bitch,” after the judge had found him in contempt of court for failure to pay child support. He was convicted for threatening a judge, with his conviction being based on both statements and conduct, and was affirmed in State v. Perkins, (Wis. App. 2000).

A threat can also be inferred from a physical act or innuendo of language. During a brawl among two officers and a burglary suspect, plus the suspect’s aunt, a revolver belonging to one of the officers was pulled from its holster and turned on that officer by the defendant. As the officer attempted to retreat, the defendant shot him several times. The second officer, still on the ground struggling with the defendant’s aunt, turned at the sound of the shots and noticed that the defendant was three or four feet away from him, and was the loaded gun at his chest. The defendant repeated, “Let her go,” and when the officer attempted to get up, the defendant quickly approached, gradually backed off and ran. Besides the assault on the first officer, the defendant was guilty of terroristic threatening of the second officer, based on his physical acts and the implication of his words, State v. Tillman, (Neb. App. 1993).

The most common definition of a terroristic or criminal threat has five elements:

1. Someone willfully threatens to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily harm. This would be a threat that is of a highly dangerous nature.
2. The threat is made with the specific intent that it be taken as a threat. This means someone makes a threat and even if there is no actual intent to carry it out, it is still a crime (i.e., a threat to blow up a school).
3. The threat is so unequivocal (a direct statement such as, “I will blow up the school,” as opposed to, “I can blow up the school”), unconditional (i.e., “If you…then, I’ll . . .), specific (not vague) as to convey a gravity of purpose and the immediate prospect of execution.
4. The threat actually caused fear in the victim. This means people actually believe the threat is real.
5. The fear is reasonable. This means that the fear generated by the threat is a fear that any reasonable person in the victim’s situation would feel.

Terrorist threatening has taken on new meanings since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States. And although the law is a general law that can be used to prosecute terrorists, it has more often been used to prosecute situations that involve domestic violence, hate crimes, bomb threats, and school violence. Consequently, state laws prohibiting terroristic threats must be narrow in scope so as to avoid infringing upon First Amendment rights. Only when a person threatens a crime that meets specific requirements can the person be prosecuted for terroristic threatening. To distinguish between protected First Amendment speech and unprotected criminal threats, courts look closely at the context in which the words are spoken and the surrounding circumstances.

The penalties for making a terrorist threat will depend on what state the offense occurs in and whether the perpetrator is charged with a federal or state crime. Sometimes the punishment can be as little as a year in jail. In other instances (especially under federal law), the punishments can be extremely severe. Individuals who threaten the use of a biological toxin can receive life in prison. In addition, the law provides for up to five years in prison for mailing communications that contain any threat to injure the addressee or any other person, and five years for those who lie to law enforcement officials about terrorist hoaxes.

Defenses for terroristic threatening usually center around the First Amendment rights of the individual and that individual’s right to free speech.

Domestic violence covers a wide range of abuse including any threatening or violent act, regardless of intent or lack thereof to harm another.  Domestic violence examples include threats of imminent bodily harm, intimidation, stalking, physical assault or abuse (i.e., hitting, slapping, pushing, shoving, kicking, biting, pinching, punching, hair pulling, beating), and sexual abuse  (i.e. unwanted sexual touching, forced sexual acts).  Domestic violence occurs in every racial, socioeconomic, ethnic, and religious group, although conditions such as poverty, drug or alcohol abuse, and mental illness increase its likelihood.  In addition, studies indicate that the incidence of domestic violence among homosexual couples is approximately equivalent to that found among heterosexual couples.

Domestic violence laws involving married or cohabiting couples received vast media attention during the 1990s. The highly publicized 1995 trial of former professional football player and movie actor  O. J. (Orenthal James) Simpson for the murders of his former wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend Ronald Lyle Goldman thrust the domestic violence issue onto the front pages of newspapers for many months. Simpson was acquitted of the murder charges, but evidence produced at his trial showed that he was arrested in 1989 for spousal battery and that he had threatened to kill his former wife on numerous occasions.  The disclosure that a prominent sports figure and movie star had abused his wife prompted national discussion on the causes of domestic violence, its prevalence, and effective means of eliminating it.  Some think that stricter consequences may be one way to decrease the number of domestic violence cases that make it into the United States court system for adjudication.

Domestic violence charges may be filed as a misdemeanor or a felony. The filing decision is made exclusively by the prosecutor of the case and is based on the facts of the case, victim and witness credibility, and severity of the victim’s injuries.  Severe injuries (including multiple bruises and broken bones) will almost always be charged as a felony. No injury or slight injury cases will generally be filed as a misdemeanor.  Both prior acts of reported domestic violence and the criminal history of the accused may also influence how a case is filed as well as the outcome and sentencing at trial.

The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 makes it a federal crime to cross a state or Indian country line to commit a crime of violence against a spouse or intimate partner, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2262(a)(1); or to force a partner to cross a state line and in the course or as a result of doing so commit a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2262(A)(2).  VAWA also criminalizes interstate stalking, §2261A; crossing or causing a person to cross state lines in violation of a protective order, § 2262; and accords full faith and credit to protective orders so those protective orders can be enforced in all states and Indian lands, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2265.  For example, a defendant’s conviction was upheld in U.S. v. Page, (6th Cir. 1999), when the defendant severely beat his ex-girlfriend into near-unconsciousness, carried her to his car and drove for four hours across state lines, threatening her with more violence to keep her from seeking help while her injuries worsened as the trip progressed.  Aggravation of preexisting injuries while crossing state lines was held to be sufficient to prove a criminal violation of VAWA.  Incidentally, a woman was convicted under VAWA for driving from New Jersey to New York where she and an accomplice murdered her estranged husband with axes (U.S. v. Gluzman, (2d Cir. 1998).

Consequences for conviction on a misdemeanor charge of domestic violence include mandatory domestic counseling, probation or parole, a brief sentence (0 to 1 year), mandatory anger management class, significant fines and/or charitable donations, community service hours, and stay-away orders from the victim.  A felony charge can result in the same consequences with added jail time.

Defenses for a domestic violence charge includes proving the act was performed as an act of self defense, showing insufficient evidence, proving factual innocence, and proving the act was justifiable or excusable. Domestic violence laws seek to protect by preventing a situation escalating to further crimes, but they also punish offenders.

At first, DNA fingerprinting was used to establish genetic relationships in paternity and immigration cases. It was first used to secure a conviction of rape in 1987 and is becoming more common in violent crimes, such as assault and battery charges, in which skin, semen or blood is found. Since then, DNA Fingerprinting has been subject to great controversy and scrutiny by the scientific and criminal justice community.

Leading scientists have waged battles in the courtroom over the reliability of forensic DNA fingerprinting. From the accuracy of the testing methods and the quality control standards, to the admissibility and acceptance of DNA testing as evidence in criminal trials, every aspect of DNA testing is being questioned. While the battle wages on in court, it should be acknowledged that the greatest use at this time is exonerating the wrongly convicted. A strong concentration should be placed on the role DNA fingerprinting plays as evidence to exonerate the innocent, while continuing the development of more accurate testing and the acceptance as a conclusive form of evidence at trial is widely gained.

At this stage, the advantages of using DNA fingerprinting to exonerate outweigh the advantages of using the evidence to convict at trial. This paper will outline the various advantages and disadvantages of each, and it will be evident that although DNA fingerprinting is undeniably a true asset to the criminal trial, its greatest use for the moment is for the exoneration of the wrongly convicted.

The technique of DNA fingerprinting relies on the fact that, except for identical twins, everyone’s DNA is unique. The controversy begins when a match is made. Each person’s entire genetic code is unique. However, genetic profiling examines only a tiny fraction of a person’s DNA. Statistical models are used to demonstrate that two DNA samples match.

There are two DNA testing methods currently being used. The most accurate method of DNA profiling, involving restriction fragment length polymorphism, or RFLP, requires extracting genetic material from small amounts of body tissue or fluid – blood, saliva, bone, skin or a hair follicle. This method only requires a bloodstain as small as a quarter. Tiny fragments of the DNA are then used to generate images that look similar to barcodes, which are examined visually for a match with DNA fragments from the suspect. RFLP profiling takes weeks to complete and can cost several thousand dollars per sample. It has been used to link at least 700 individuals to crimes.

The updated DNA fingerprinting process, the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) method, employs an enzyme that scientists can direct towards regions of the DNA that are known to contain variations. The enzyme then copies the region. When the process is repeated about 30 times – with the number doubling each time – more than a billion copies are produced. These can be projected onto a nylon strip in the form of blue dots that delineate the genetic profiles of the segments. Unlike the RFLP method, the PCR system can be carried out in a matter of days. It can be performed on small amounts of DNA, and even on DNA that has begun to degrade.

The major advantage of DNA’s use in exoneration is the conclusiveness of the results. It is simple black and white: if there is no match between DNA found at the scene of a crime and DNA from a suspect, the suspect is automatically absolved. In the case of conviction, there may be no suspect in custody to match with the DNA found at the crime scene.

In 1992 Guy Paul Morin was convicted of killing a 9-year-old Ontario girl. Morin’s conviction was not based on the DNA evidence available because the tests carried out were inconclusive. The sample taken from the girl’s underpants was not pure. The sample had been contaminated by various biological elements surrounding the girl’s body. In 1995, a Boston lab carried out a new round of tests using the DNA fingerprinting process. Scientists removed the other biological material clinging to the underpants to extract an uncontaminated sample of DNA. The evidence was conclusive. The DNA taken from the underpants did not match Morin’s.

Another factor that figures prominently into the positive aspects of DNA fingerprinting is compulsory DNA sampling. An argument in its favor arose from the Morin case. The tests that proved Morin’s innocence also yielded a genetic profile of the unknown suspect. If a national registry of DNA samples was established and the DNA profile gained from the recent Morin test was stored in the national registry, prosecutors might someday be able to bring the real suspect to justice if he were to commit another crime. The practice of obtaining these DNA samples must be closely monitored so as not to infringe upon a person’s constitutional rights. Twenty-six states now keep DNA data on felons as well as thumbprints and fingerprints.

Despite the debates over fairness that DNA testing promotes, many scientists and lawyers insist that the true beauty of “genetic justice” is that it is even-handed. “I’ve been telling people, ‘Stop looking at DNA as the great convicter,’” says Derrill Prevett, a Victoria lawyer who has prosecuted four cases involving DNA evidence. “It’s more objective than that – and it can completely eliminate people from suspicion.”

The act of battery (the actus reus) is physical injury or offensive touching of another person.  The amount of harm required to qualify a crime as a battery varies, with some states including intimate fondling or a spit in the face as acts constituting a battery.  The state of mind (mens rea) element of battery is the intent to injure or offensively touch another.  Battery mens rea is negated when the intent to make harmful contact is justifiable.  For example, pushing someone back from a bridge rail to prevent the person from jumping off would not make you guilty of battery.   Also, the consent assumed in contact sports where injury might occur in the playing of the game does not constitute battery.

While battery may be committed recklessly, assault involves purposeful intent.  In fact, one type of assault is actually an attempted battery, where the intent is obviously to commit the battery.  Thus, assault is considered an inchoate crime (an incomplete crime) because during an assault the battery is not completed and there is no injury.  According to some state statues, the victim may not even be aware of the attempt in order for a charge of assault to be made.  Another type of assault is threatened battery, where the intent is to frighten the victim.  Though no physical injury occurs, this is a complete crime because generally, the victim knows of the threat and does, in fact, fear serious injury as a result of the threat.  Words alone do not form assault, particularly if they are conditional or if the threat is not an immediate one.

Aggravated assault and aggravated battery are felonies that carry severe penalties in the criminal justice system.  An aggravating circumstance must accompany the assault or battery for the crime to escalate to an aggravated state.  An aggravated crime occurs when there is serious, or grave, intent on the part of the defendant, or when the defendant uses extraordinarily dangerous means in the perpetration of the assault or battery.  An aggravated assault is committed when a defendant intends to do more than merely frighten the victim.  Common types of aggravated assaults are those accompanied by intent to kill, rob, or rape.  An assault with a dangerous weapon is aggravated if there is intent to cause serious harm.  Pointing an unloaded gun at a victim to frighten the individual is not considered an aggravated assault, but is a simple assault.  When a battery is committed with intent to do serious harm or murder, or when it is done with a dangerous weapon, it is classified as aggravated.  A weapon is considered dangerous whenever the purpose for using it is to cause death or do serious harm.

Federal statutes are designed to enhance the penalties and punishment for an aggravated assault or battery.  In addition to statutes that increase punishments for aggravated assaults and batteries, there are special assault and battery statutes designed to enhance the punishment for assault and battery if the offense is committed against particular people, for example police officers, the elderly, and minors.  Federal assault prosecutions, like federal homicide prosecutions, are rare because federal laws only establish jurisdiction over forcible resistance or interference with, or assault upon, officers of the United States, on foreign officers, and within maritime and territorial areas, 18 U.S.C.A. § 111-113.

Because every completed battery includes assault, a defendant committing a battery usually cannot be separately convicted for an assault.  However, when the degrees of the assault and battery charges differ, there can be two separate convictions for the two offenses, with the possibility of serving two different penalties for a single criminal incident.

The penalties for criminal assault and battery convictions include imprisonment or jail time, probation or parole, mandatory anger management class, and significant fines.

Defenses for assault and battery charges include insufficient evidence (the most common being an absence of the intent to harm the person), a claim of defending others or defending property by using reasonable force, provocation, intoxication, and insanity.  In general, these defenses serve most often to lower the charge to a lesser one as opposed to discharging the charge altogether.

Vehicular homicide is a lesser charge than manslaughter and is included in the offense of negligent homicide.  Vehicular homicide statutes basically consider a vehicle as a potentially deadly weapon which allows for easy conviction and sometimes severe penalties.  The victim of a vehicular homicide may be either a person not in the car with the driver, a pedestrian or other motorist, or a passenger in the vehicle with the driver.  Drivers convicted of vehicular homicide are given shorter sentences than people found to be guilty of other types of homicide, but do end up with a criminal record and some form of lesser punishment.

The advent of vehicular homicide as a separate crime from manslaughter is a result of the reluctance of juries in the criminal justice system to convict automobile drivers of murder or manslaughter for death caused by reckless or negligent driving.  Thus, the standards of proof and those for sentencing are less stringent for vehicular homicide than for involuntary manslaughter, and in some states vehicular homicide is part of the vehicle code rather than the criminal code. In other states, drunk drivers can face murder charges.  In Ohio a man pled no contest to charges of running a red light and vehicular homicide when an airbag deployed in an accident and killed his infant son.  Though no law in Ohio required that the airbag be switched off, and no law, as of the time of the incident, stipulated that the child had to be in the back seat, safety stickers in the vehicle and on the baby’s care seat warned of the danger.  The father was sentenced to spend the child’s birthday and the anniversary of the accident in jail.

In various states, vehicular homicide is referred to by various terminologies with the same crime being referenced.  However, in other states, the offense is distinctly defined, as in Texas where the term used is intoxication manslaughter.  Intoxication manslaughter is defined as “a crime in which a person operates a motor vehicle in a public place, operates an aircraft, a watercraft, or an amusement ride, or assembles a mobile amusement ride while intoxicated, and by reason of that intoxication, causes the death of another by accident or mistake” (Tex. Penal Code §49.08).  The fact that a defendant is entitled to use alcohol, or some other substance, is not a valid defense for intoxication manslaughter in Texas.  In fact, in New York to be convicted of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, it is not necessary to prove the person was negligent in causing the death of another, nor that they unlawfully used the substance that intoxicated them, but only that they were intoxicated, operated a motor vehicle, and someone died (N.Y. Penal Law § 125.3).

Vehicular homicide can be charged either as a misdemeanor or as a felony, depending on the severity of the situation and whether the driver was merely negligent or grossly negligent in operating his vehicle.  A misdemeanor vehicular homicide charge is considered a minor crime with a maximum punishment of a year in jail and a fine.  A felony charge of vehicular homicide is punishable by a term in state prison, the time of the prison term depending upon the circumstances of the incident.  Gross negligence or driving a few miles over the speed limit might be charged as a misdemeanor, but drunk driving resulting in a fatality will most likely be treated as a felony.  In general, consequences for a conviction on a charge of vehicular homicide or vehicular manslaughter are long-term imprisonment, probation or parole, revocation of driving privileges, and significant fines.

Defenses for vehicular homicide include, proving the driver was not at fault, proving a lack of negligence, showing insufficient evidence, and proving factual innocence. Defending of these cases in the US criminal justice system is best handled by experienced and specialized attorneys.

Murder is perhaps the single most serious criminal offense ever committed.  Historically murder was the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, with the term aforethought not necessarily meaning that the killer planned or premeditated on the killing, or that the killer felt malice toward the victim, but rather, aforethought referred to a level of intent or recklessness that separated murder from other killings and warranted stiffer punishment.

Under most statutes in the United States, murder comes in four varieties: (1) intentional murder, (2) a killing that results from the intent to do serious bodily injury, (3) a killing that results from a depraved heart or extreme recklessness, and (4) murder committed by an accomplice during the commission of, attempt of, or flight from a felony.

Intentional murder involves a murderous state of mind and can be assigned to killings when there is a deliberate intention manifested unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow human being or when no considerable provocation is present, or when the circumstances surrounding the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.  A killing that results from the intent to do serious bodily injury is the next level of murder, and encompasses a defendant intending to do serious bodily injury or acting extremely recklessly.  For example, if an aggressor punches a victim in the nose, intending only to injure the victim’s face, the aggressor may be charged with murder if the victim dies from the blow.  The infliction of the serious bodily injury becomes the equivalent of intent to kill when the victim dies.  Under the abandoned and malignant heart theory of murder, a person can be charged with murder if a killing results from gross negligence.  For instance, if a man accidentally shoots and kills someone while practicing the shooting a firearm in his backyard, he can be charged with murder.

Felony murder statutes come into play when a person is attempting to commit a specified felony and during the commission of the felony, during an attempt to commit the felony, or during flight from the felony, or attempted felony, kills someone.  For example, if two persons rob a bank and during the robbery one of them shoots and kills a security guard, the accomplice who did not actually pull the trigger may nevertheless be charged with criminal homicide.

Most state law in the criminal justice system provides for two levels of murder, murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree.   In these states, any intentional, unlawful killing done without justification or excuse is a second-degree murder, punishable with a long prison term or a prison term for life without parole.  A first-degree murder conviction is a more serious offense than second-degree murder, and labels the murder as one that was accomplished with an aggravating or a special circumstance.   An aggravating or special circumstance is some circumstance or situation which makes the crime especially heinous or somehow worthy of extra punishment.

Depending on the circumstances surrounding a killing, a person convicted of murder may be sentenced to many years in prison, a prison sentence with no possibility of parole, or death.  Second-degree murder usually is punished with more than twenty years in prison, while first-degree murder is punished with a life term in prison without the possibility of parole; and in states where the death penalty is practiced, first-degree murder is punishable by death.  In addition, a defendant’s criminal history may affect sentencing for a murder conviction, with more time being given to a person with a long history of criminal behavior.

The best defenses to a murder charge are provocation and self-defense.  If the defendant acted completely in self-defense, the defendant may be relieved of all criminal liability, or at least the charge may be reduced from murder to manslaughter.  Provocation rarely produces complete absolution, but may reduce the defendant’s liability in a case of criminal homicide.  Another defense to a murder charge is insanity.  If a defendant was suffering from a defect of the mind and did not know what they were doing, or did not know that what they were doing was wrong, they may be found not guilty by reason of insanity (guilty but mentally ill) and confined to a mental institution instead of a prison.  Other defenses for a murder case include necessity, accident, insufficient proof or evidence, factual innocence, and intoxication.